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Motivated by the price-setting process of water utilities in Chile, I study a ﬁnal-oﬀer
arbitration game in which two parties simultaneously submits oﬀers for each of the two
or more units in which the item in dispute has been divided. The arbitrator is limited to
choose one party’s oﬀer or the other for each unit. While the introduction of multiple oﬀers
allows the arbitrator to get closer to her ideal settlement it may prompt an arbitrarily large
divergence between the parties’ oﬀers. The latter, however, does not aﬀect the arbitrator’s
ability to learn from the oﬀers.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Departing from the more traditional rate-of return and price-cap regulations, prices of public
utilities in Chile are set using a particular form of yardstick regulation in which the bench-
marking is based on a hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm.1 Under this price setting process–introduced
ﬁrst in the electricity sector in the early 1980s–both the regulator and the regulated ﬁrm
have a very explicit interaction. Based on their own estimation for the long term costs of this
hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm, both parties propose the price to be charged by the regulated ﬁrm
for the duration of the review period (4-5 years).2 If parties cannot agree on the price, the
disagreement is settled through an arbitration process.
Since 1999 this arbitration process takes a distinct form in the water sector. In order to
prevent parties’ oﬀers to signiﬁcantly diverge, as has occurred in the other regulated sectors, the
legislation that norms the water sector considers a ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration mechanism in which
the arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the parties’ oﬀers as a settlement.3 But because
parties do no submit a single oﬀer for the entire ﬁrm but rather an oﬀer for each of the cost
units in which the ﬁrm is divided,4 the actual arbitration mechanism looks more like a hybrid
between ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration and conventional arbitration.5
While the division of the regulated ﬁrm in various units was aimed at introducing greater
transparency into the regulatory process and avoiding subsidization across cost units, evidence
on the ﬁrst round of applying this price setting process for the diﬀerent water utilities in the
country has not been uncontroversial. As shown in Table 1, we observe in most cases an
important divergence between the regulator’s overall oﬀer, pr,a n dt h eﬁrm’s overall oﬀer, pf
(to facilitate the exposition pr has been normalize to 100).6 And in ﬁve cases parties failed to
negotiate the ﬁnal price, ps, and had instead resorted to ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration (FOA).
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE OR BELOW
1See Vogelsang (2002) for an overview of the diﬀerent regulatory approaches practiced over the last 20 years.
2In reality, each party constructs an eﬃcient ﬁrm and announces the long term total cost that such ﬁrm would
incur in providing the service during the review period. In this construction, parties may diﬀer not only about
unit costs but also about projections of future demand.
3The use ﬁnal-oﬀe ra r b i t r a t i o ni sc o m m o n l ys e e ni nt h es e t t l e m e n t of labor disputes (with baseball as a classic
example) but I am not aware of its explicit use elsewhere in a regulatory context.
4There are approximately 200 units including, for example, cost of raw water, cost of capital, cost of replacing
pavement, etc. For more see Sánchez and Coria (2003).
5In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator is not constrained to any particular settlement. So, as the number
of units goes large, ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration would seem to approach conventional arbitration since the arbitrator
is able to chose almost any settlement by using some combination of parties’ oﬀers.
6The numbers shown are based on parties’ announcements of long term total costs.
2The numbers in Table 1 naturally raise the empirical question about what are the factors that
characterize the contract zone of Farber and Bazerman (1989), i.e., the range of settlements
that both parties prefer to disagreement. The great divergence in parties’ oﬀers, however,
have raised more fundamental questions. Some observers have challenged the advantages of
the current regulatory mechanism over more conventional mechanisms, particularly price-caps
as practiced in the UK, while others have questioned the privatization process itself arguing
that the increase in information asymmetries have more than oﬀset any productivity gains.7
Rather than introducing radical changes in both the privatization program and the regulatory
scheme, the authority is exploring ways in which the actual divergence in parties’ oﬀers could
be diminished. In particular, it is proposing to substantially reduce the multiplicity of oﬀers,
i.e., the numbers of units in which the regulated ﬁrm is divided. Reducing the number of oﬀers
seems reasonable since it would make the arbitration process look less like the cheap-talk game
associated to conventional arbitration.
With the purpose of better understanding agents’ behavior in this price-setting process, in
this paper I extend the (single-oﬀer) ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration models of Farber (1980) and Gibbons
(1988) to the case in which parties simultaneously submit oﬀers for each of the units that are
part of the item in dispute and the arbitrator is limited to choose one party’s oﬀer or the other
for each unit, so in principle, she is free tof a s h i o nac o m p r o m i s eb ya w a r d i n gs o m eo ﬀers to
one party and the rest to the second party. Despite this multi-dimensional variant of ﬁnal-
oﬀer arbitration was already recognized by Farber in his article as “issue by issue” ﬁnal-oﬀer
arbitration, there is no formal analysis of such problem in the literature. There is a seemingly
related problem in the literature that is the analysis of split award auctions where it is possible
for a buyer to split a production award between two or more suppliers (Anton and Yao, 1989
and 1992). Besides the multi-dimensional structure, these problems have little in common,
however. While in split award auctions bidding parties seek to coordinate in high prices that
would report positive proﬁts for both, in ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration parties have no incentives to
coordinate in any particular outcome since they have opposing preferences (otherwise, there
w o u l db en or e a s o nt or e s o r tt oa r b i t r a t i o n ) .
Understanding the equilibrium properties of this arbitration game is not only relevant for
the price-setting process that motivated this paper,8 but more generally, for any ﬁnal-oﬀer
7See Gomez-Lobo and Vargas (2002) for a further discussion on the shortcomings of the current regulatory
scheme.
8This arbitration scheme has also been proposed in place of the current mechanisms used to settle disputes
3arbitration in which more than one issue is in dispute (e.g., a government and a contractor
renegotiating a multi-part contract). The model of the paper is standard in that it is based
on a one-period game that considers two parties (i.e., the ﬁrm and the regulator) with op-
posing preferences that simultaneously submit oﬀers to an arbitrator whose ideal settlement is
imperfectly known by both parties (recall that parties’ uncertainty regarding the arbitrator’s
preferences is what leads to oﬀers divergence).9 Attending the spirit of the legislation, the ar-
bitrator wants to choose eﬃcient prices, i.e., prices that are closest to the long-term cost of the
hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm. But since the parties are much better informed about the true cost
of this eﬃcient ﬁrm than the arbitrator is (in part because they conduct detail studies before
the price-setting process), I follow Gibbons (1988) in that the arbitrator may eventually learn
a great deal from the parties’ (equilibrium) oﬀers about the true cost of this eﬃcient ﬁrm.10
The results of the paper can be presented as the answers to three basic questions that I
tackle in diﬀerent sections of the paper. The ﬁrst question is to what extent the introduction
of multiple oﬀers (whether two or more) aﬀects the divergence between parties’ overall oﬀers
(Section 3). I show that when parties have perfect knowledge about the arbitrator’s ideal
settlement, parties’ oﬀe r se x h i b i t ,a si nt h es i n g l e - o ﬀer game, perfect convergence. When parties
are uncertain about the arbitrator’s preferences, as it is usually the case, the division of the
ﬁrm in just two cost units results in multiple equilibria implying that the divergence between
parties’ equilibrium oﬀers is not unique but can be anything between that of the single-oﬀer
game and above.
Contrary to the single-oﬀer game, in which parties’ equilibrium oﬀers are unique (Farber,
1980), the multiplicity of equilibria raises a second question that is to what extent the arbitra-
tor’s ability to learn from the parties’ oﬀers is hampered by the introduction of multiple oﬀers
(Section 4). As in the single-oﬀer game, in which the arbitrator perfectly recovers parties’ cost
information from the average of parties’ oﬀers (Gibbons, 1988), I ﬁnd that the introduction
of multiple oﬀers does not necessarily aﬀect the arbitrator’s ability to learn from the parties’
oﬀers. This is because in (separating Bayesian) equilibrium the arbitrator does not learn from
the absolute value of the individual or overall oﬀers submitted by the parties but from the
over regulated prices in the electricity and telecommunication sectors in Chile.
9As in Farber (1980) and the literature that has followed, I do not include a previous stage in which parties
bargain over the ﬁnal price before going to arbitration, so I do not intent to explain what makes parties more
likely to reach an agreement rather than end in arbitration. For more see Farber and Bazerman (1989).
10More generally, empirical studies of arbitrator behavior indicate that arbitrators do use parties’ oﬀers to
compute their ideal settlement (e.g., Farber and Bazerman, 1986; Ashenfelter and Bloom, 1984).
4relationship that these oﬀers exhibit in equilibrium; a relationship that remains regardless of
the divergence between parties’ equilibrium oﬀers.
If the introduction of multiple oﬀers does not aﬀect learning, despite parties’ oﬀers can
exhibit substantial divergence, the remaining question deals with welfare gains or losses from
introducing multiple oﬀers (Section 5). Intuitively, one would argue that multiple oﬀers provide
the arbitrator with more ﬂexibility to put together a settlement closer to her ideal settlement
(i.e., the true cost of the eﬃcient ﬁrm) by combining oﬀers from both parties. Although one
can construct examples where the arbitrator is further away from her ideal choice, I show that
in equilibrium, the parties’ oﬀe r sa r es t r u c t u r e di ns u c haw a yt h a ti ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l ef o rt h e
arbitrator to choose a ﬁnal price (which combines oﬀers from both parties) that is expected to
be closer to her ideal settlement than in the single-oﬀer case.
The model developed in this paper provides us with results that have important implica-
tions for the design of ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration mechanisms. In particular, they indicate that the
introduction of multiple oﬀers is likely to enhance welfare, despite the increase in the divergence
between parties’ oﬀers. Before proceeding, however, I should emphasize that this paper is by no
means an attempt to discuss the merits of the regulatory approach under study over alternative
approaches such as price caps but rather understand the eﬀect of regulatory design on parties
behavior. With that objective in mind, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, I introduce the model using the single-oﬀer game. In Sections 3, 4 and 5, I extend the model
to two oﬀers and use it to address, respectively, the three questions raised above. Concluding
remarks are in Section 6.
2T h e s i n g l e - o ﬀer arbitration model
Let start with the single-oﬀer arbitration game. In this case parties are asked to submit a single
oﬀer for the entire ﬁrm and the arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the parties’ oﬀers as
a settlement. The parties’ oﬀers are denoted by pf and pr.
2.1 Preferences and information
The arbitrator is characterized by the parameter z, which describes the arbitrator’s most pre-
ferred settlement. If the actual settlement is p, the arbitrator’s utility is va(p,z)=−(p − z)2.
Since the spirit of the legislation is to charge (eﬃcient) prices to consumers that just cover the
5long term costs of an hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm, we assume that the arbitrator’s ideal price set-
tlement is directly related to the cost of this eﬃcient ﬁrm, which we denote by c. In particular,
I assume that z(c)=c. This assumption is also consistent with the idea the arbitrator would
like to be rehired.11
Unlike the arbitrator, the ﬁrm and the regulator are assumed to be risk-neutral.12 As in
Farber (1980) and Gibbons (1988), both parties are assumed to have strictly opposed prefer-
ences: the ﬁrm seeks to maximize the arbitrator’s expected settlement, while the regulator seeks
to minimize it. It may seem odd that preferences are totally disconnected from the cost of the
hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm. While little problematic for a ﬁrm that faces an inelastic demand,13
it is unlikely that the regulator would only care about consumer surplus and put no weight on
ﬁrm’s proﬁts. As shown in Montero (2003), however, the results do not qualitatively change
if the regulator puts some weight on ﬁrm’s proﬁts because parties incentives work basically
the same as long as their preferences are not perfectly aligned. Accordingly, I maintain the
assumption that parties have strictly opposed preferences in order to keep the analysis simple.
Neither the arbitrator nor the parties have perfect information about the true cost of the
hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm (which is not necessarily the same as the actual ﬁrm) but they do not
necessarily share the same perceptions about this cost. Following Gibbons’ (1988) information
structure (I also follow Gibbons’ notation very closely), let the arbitrator’s perception about
t h et r u ec o s tc be summarized by the noisy signal
ca = c + εa (1)
where c is normally distributed with mean m and precision h,a n dεa is normally distributed
with zero mean and precision ha. The parameters m and h are common knowledge and can be
interpreted as the publicly observable facts relevant for the regulation of the ﬁrm. Note that
as ha grows inﬁnitely large (i.e., variance of εa goes to zero), the arbitrator can perfectly infer
the cost c.
11For more on arbitrator behavior see Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984).
12The introduction of risk-aversion complicates the algebra without producing a qualitative change in the
results. See Montero (2003).
13As u ﬃciently low price elasticity ensures that, in equilibrium, the ﬁrm will never submitt a price oﬀer above
its monopoly price.
6Similarly, let the parties’ knowledge about the true cost c be summarized by the noisy signal
cp = c + εp (2)
where εp is normally distributed with zero mean and precision hp. It is important to emphasize
that this information structure assumes that the parties —the ﬁrm and the regulator— share
t h es a m ep e r c e p t i o na b o u tt h et r u ec o s tc. While letting hp >h a this information structure
captures the idea that both parties are considerably better informed than the arbitrator, it is
not so clear that both parties should share the exact same perception about c.S i n c ec is not the
cost of the ﬁrm that is currently providing the service (although it is related), the ﬁrm is likely
to be better informed about site speciﬁcities while the regulator, making use of information
collected from all the other regulated water ﬁrms, may be better informed about some of the
parameters that are common across ﬁrms (e.g., labor productivity).14 It would certainly add
more realism to the analysis the introduction of asymmetric information via diﬀerent random
shocks with diﬀerent levels of precision, but that has not been done for the single-oﬀer case,
much less so for the case of multiple oﬀers. I return to this point in the last section of the
paper.
The information structure can be summarized as follows: the arbitrator observes ca,t h e
parties both observe cp,n oo n eo b s e r v e sc,a n dm, h, hp,a n dha are common knowledge.
In addition, the three random variables c, εa,a n dεp are assumed to be independent of each
other, which facilitates the computation of the Bayesian updating following the arrival of new
information (e.g., signals, parties’ oﬀers). For example, the conditional distribution of c given
cj,w h e r ej = a,p,i sn o r m a lw i t hm e a nMj(cj) and precision Hj,w h e r e
Mj(cj)=
hm + hjcj
h + hj (3)
and
Hj = h + hj (4)
Similarly, the conditional distribution of c given ca and cp is normal with mean Map(ca,c p) and
precision Hap,w h e r e
Map(ca,c p)=
hm + haca + hpcp
h + ha + hp (5)
14See Teeples and Glyer (1987) for a discussion on diﬀerences in production eﬃciency across water utilities.
7and
Hap = h + ha + hp (6)
I will make use of these deﬁnitions of beliefs updating in the models that follow.
2.2 Arbitration without learning
Let consider ﬁrst the case in which the arbitrator only pays attention to its noisy signal ca in
constructing her ideal settlement. Ignoring parties’ oﬀers may not be sequentially rational, as
we discussed later, but it is a useful starting point to understand the implications of learning
and the multiplicity of oﬀers on the equilibrium of this arbitration game.
Acknowledging that the arbitrator ignores their oﬀers, the parties will form the common
belief that the arbitrator’s ideal settlement z is randomly distributed according to some cu-
mulative distribution (to be determined below) function F(z),w i t hd e n s i t yf(z).S i n c e t h e
arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the parties’ oﬀers as the settlement, she will choose
the oﬀer that is closer to her ideal settlement z.A s s u m i n gf o rt h em o m e n tt h a ti ne q u i l i b r i u m
the regulator’s oﬀer, pr, will be smaller than the ﬁrm’s oﬀer, pf, the arbitrator will choose the
regulator’s oﬀe ri fa n do n l yi fz<p,w h e r ep =( pr + pf)/2; hence, the probability that pr is
picked by the arbitrator is F(p).
The timing of the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game is as follows. First, the regulator and the ﬁrm
simultaneously submit their oﬀers to the arbitrator.15 Second, the arbitrator chooses the oﬀer
that maximizes his utility function va(p,z) as the settlement. The parties’ Nash equilibrium
oﬀers (pf and pr) maximize their expected payoﬀs, so they are found by simultaneously solving
max
pf prF(p)+pf[1 − F(p)] (7)
and
min
pr prF(p)+pf[1 − F(p)] (8)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for this optimization problem are16
1 − F(p)=( pf − pr)f(p)/2 (9)
15As in Farber (1980) and subsequent papers I do not explicitly model a ﬁrst stage where parties can bargain
before going to arbitration. We can think of p
r and p
f as the last oﬀers during the bargaining period.
16Note that the convexity of the arbitrator’s utility function assures the existence of equilibrium.
8and




pf − pr =1 /f(p) (12)
Eqs. (11) and (12) summarize Farber’s (1980) Nash equilibrium: parties’ oﬀers are centered
around the mean of the parties’ belief about the arbitrator’s ideal settlement (i.e., Ep[z],w h e r e
E[·] is the expected value operator) and the distance between the equilibrium oﬀers decreases
as this belief becomes more precise (i.e., higher f(·)). Notice that in equilibrium pf >p r,a s
previously assumed. In deciding about their oﬀers, each party must balance a trade-oﬀ between
making a more aggressive oﬀer and reducing the probability that the oﬀer will be chosen by
the arbitrator. In the limit, when there is no uncertainty about the arbitrator’s preferences (h
inﬁnitely large), both parties submit the arbitrator’s ideal settlement, that is pr = pf = z.
The equilibrium values of pr and pf depend on F(z). Parties know from (3) that the
arbitrator’s ideal settlement (in the absence of learning) would be
z(ca)=Ma(ca)=
hm + haca
h + ha (13)
Given cp, parties know that F(z(ca)) is a normal distribution with mean m0 (Ep[z]=m0)a n d
precision h0,w h e r e
m0 =
hm + haMp(cp)
h + ha (14)
and
h0 =
(h + hp)(h + ha)
ha(h + ha + hp)
(15)
which imply that the equilibrium oﬀers reduce to









9Note that cp has an eﬀect on the parties’ equilibrium oﬀers not because it improves their
knowledge about c but because it aﬀects parties’ belief about the arbitrator’s ideal settlement.
2.3 Learning
As explained by Gibbons (1988), it is not sequentially rational for the arbitrator to ignore
parties’ oﬀers because she can learn from them. In fact, the average of the oﬀers is m0,s of r o m( 3 )
and (14), the arbitrator can obtain a point estimate of cp,t h a ti scp(m0). Sequential rationality
then requires that the arbitrator’s ideal settlement be not Ma(ca) but Map(ca,c p(m0)),w h i c h ,
from (5), is given by
z(ca,p f,p r)=
hm + haca + hpcp(m0)
h + ha + hp (18)
In this way, the parties’ oﬀers help the arbitrator to have a more precise estimate, in statistical
terms, of c. Knowing that the arbitrator may learn from their oﬀers, each party now takes
also into account the eﬀe c tt h a th i s / h e ro ﬀer can have on the arbitrator’s inference about the
ideal settlement. Gibbons (1988) demonstrates that there exists a separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which the arbitrator perfectly infers cp from the average of the parties’ oﬀers.
Despite parties consider the gain from misleading the arbitrator when choosing their oﬀers, in
equilibrium parties ﬁnd it optimal not to do so. To save on space, I leave the development of
the learning equilibrium for the multiple-oﬀers case (Section 4).
3M u l t i p l e o ﬀers without learning
An important diﬀerence between Farber’s and Gibbon’s models and the regulatory scheme
studied in this paper is that parties do not submit a single oﬀer but multiple oﬀers. Consider
then the case in which the regulated ﬁrm is divided in two units or production centers: 1 and
2 (e.g., water production and water distribution).17 Note that the possibility of submitting
multiple oﬀers only aﬀect parties’ strategy space but not the actual operation of the water
utility (the ﬁrm will minimize costs regardless the price chosen for each unit), so both parties
and the arbitrator only care about the overall oﬀer p = p1 +p2 (i.e., about the ﬁnal price to be
paid by consumers) and not about the price of each individual unit.
I retain the information structure from the single-oﬀer case in that c = c1+c2, εa = εa
1 +εa
2,




2 are independent random variables with mean and precision as before. I do not
17The case with three or more oﬀers yields same results (Montero, 2003).




2,w h e r e
j = a,p.
In this multiple-oﬀer game, the regulator and the regulated ﬁrm submit simultaneously price
oﬀers for each of the two units. The regulator’s individual oﬀers are denoted by pr
1 and pr
2 and




2. The arbitrator’s task is to choose a price
oﬀer for each unit following a ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration procedure. The arbitrator will choose prices
p1 and p2 that maximize its utility va(p1,p 2,z)=−(p1 + p2 − z)2. Then, there will be four













2}. In this section I study the case of no learning and leave for the next section the case
in which the arbitrator uses the parties’ oﬀers to obtain a better estimate of c.
3.1 Certainty about the arbitrator’s preferences




k =0 ,w h e r ek =1 ,2) because it helps to illustrate equilibrium properties that carry over
to the case in which parties are uncertain about the arbitrator’s ideal settlement. Parties’ action
space and arbitrator’s ideal settlement z are depicted in Figure 1. More speciﬁcally, parties’
oﬀers for units 1 and 2 are in the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively. For example, point
A represents a regulator’s oﬀer consisting of Apr
1 for the ﬁrst unit and Apr
2 for the second unit.
The line z, on the other hand, contains those combinations of p1 and p2 that add up to z.T h e
arbitrator is indiﬀerent between any two combinations that lie on this line.
As in the one-oﬀer case, an obvious equilibrium of the game is for each party i to submit
ap a i r{pi
1,p i
2} where pi ≡ pi
1 + pi
2 = z. We know that if party i submits an overall oﬀer of
pi = z,p a r t y−i’s best response is not constrained to any oﬀer because the arbitrator would
pick pi regardless his oﬀer. But for pi = z to be a best response to party −i’s oﬀer, we must
necessarily have p−i ≡ p−i
1 + p−i
2 = z.
Let us explore now whether a pair of oﬀers equally distant from the line z,s u c ha sA and
B in Figure 1 (OA = OB), could also constitute an equilibrium of the game . If this were the
c a s e ,w ec o u l do b s e r v eo ﬀers divergence in equilibrium but with the same settlement outcome as







because both yield z; her ideal settlement. However, this is not a suitable equilibrium candidate.
If the regulator is playing A,t h eﬁrm’s best response is not playing B but playing C,w h e r e

















































Figure 1: Two-oﬀers game under certainty
indiﬀerent between C0 = {Apr
1,C p
f
2} and C00 = {Cp
f
1,A pr
2} with a price settlement of z + AO
− >z ).18 And following the same logic, we know that A cannot be the best response to C
but something further apart (more precisely, three times larger than OC). As this illustration
shows, there is no best-response correspondence oﬀ the z-line. To summarize
Proposition 1 If both parties know the arbitrator’s preference z, the Nash equilibria of the
two-oﬀers game are pi ≡ pi
1 + pi
2 = z for i = r,f.
This proposition indicates that the introduction of multiple oﬀers (as many as the number
of units in which the ﬁrm has been divided) does not aﬀect the perfect convergence of parties’
oﬀers when there is certainty about the arbitrator’s preferences. Although it has only been
formally shown for the two-oﬀers case, it should be clear that Proposition 2 extends to the case
18If for any reason the regulator’s oﬀer is to the north-east of the line z,t h eﬁrm’s best response is to play any
pair equally or further distant from z in the north-east direction.
12of three or more oﬀers.19 This is an interesting result because one would think that as the
number of oﬀers increase the arbitration process would converge to conventional arbitration in
the sense that the arbitrator can impose almost any settlement she wishes by choosing the right
combination of parties’ oﬀers. But in conventional arbitration we know that in equilibrium we
can observe either any oﬀers (as in any cheap-talk game) or maximum diﬀerentiation if the
arbitrator is believed to split diﬀerences.
3.2 Uncertainty about the arbitrator’s preferences
Let us now turn to the more realistic case in which the parties are uncertain about the arbitra-
tor’s preferences but let maintain the assumption, for now, that the arbitrator ignores parties’
oﬀers in constructing her ideal settlement. To estimate the probability that the arbitrator
choose a particular oﬀer combination we need ﬁrst to understand some regularities that prevail
in equilibrium. From the certainty case we know that if the regulator plays something like A,
the ﬁrm’s best response will lie somewhere along the line ABC depending on the value of z (if
by any chance the z-line falls to the south-west of A,t h eﬁrm will pick A). This implies that
in equilibrium we must have p
f
k >p r
k for k =1 ,2,20 which, in turn, assures that pf >p r in
equilibrium.
Since p1 and p2 are perfect substitutes, we can adopt the convention that in equilibrium
pi
2 ≥ pi






1. The probabilities can then be found by
dividing the z space in four diﬀerent regions, each supporting the election of one particular oﬀer
combination. Depending on the parties’ oﬀers there will be values z1 <z 2 <z 3 such that if z
falls in the region (−∞,z 1), the arbitrator will choose {pr
1,p r
2},i fz falls in the region [z1,z 2) the
arbitrator will choose {p
f
1,p r









As before, the parties’ Nash equilibrium oﬀers maximize their expected payoﬀs so are found
19A simple example should be enough here. Consider a three-oﬀe r sg a m ei nw h i c ht h ea r b i t r a t o r ’ si d e a l
settlement is z =$ 1 0 . If the regulator submits the oﬀer p
r = {1,2,3},w h i c hi s$ 4o ﬀ the z-plane, the ﬁrm’s best
response is not to play a symmetrically distant oﬀer such as p
f
a = {3,5,6} but to play p
f
b = {8.99,9.99,10.99},
where 0.01 is the smallest possible number, say, a penny. By submitting the latter the ﬁrm assures itself a
settlement of 13.99.S i n c ep
r is, by the same arguments, not the regulator’s best response to p
f
b, we cannot have
an equilibrium with parties’ oﬀers located oﬀ the z-plane.




























































and F(z) is a cumulative normal distribution with mean and precision given, respectively, by
(14) and (15).21




















1]:F(z1) − F(z2)+F(z3)+( pr
1 − p
f












Although the solution involves multiple equilibria as in the certainty case (any of the four








k] denotes the ﬁrst-order condition for pi
k), they all must satisfy the conditions above that
rearranged leads to




2 > 0 and that z2 = p.





i = r, f.
14Proposition 2 The parties’ overall oﬀers pr = pr
1 + pr




2 are centered around
Ep[z] and the distance between them can be anywhere between the distance in the single-oﬀer
case and above.
Proof. Let ﬁrst prove that the parties’ oﬀers are centered around Ep[z],i . e . ,F(z2 = p)=
1/2. Combine (24) with (26) and (25) with (27) to obtain, respectively




1)[f(z1) − f(z3)]/2 (29)
In addition, we know that
z3 − z2 = z2 − z1 (30)
Given the perfect colinearity between ﬁrst-order conditions (which implies that we have 3
equations for 4 unknowns), we can make an unrestricted selection for one of the 4 oﬀers,
or alternatively, for ∆ ≡ p
f
1 − pr
1 ≥ 0. Furthermore, any particular value of ∆ leads to a
unique equilibrium given the parties’ objective functions (including the arbitrator’s) that we
are considering here.23 And since f(z1)=f(z3) and F(z2)=1 /2 is an equilibrium candidate
in that solves the system (28)—(30) for any ∆ ≥ 0 and a symmetric density function such as
the normal distribution, uniqueness implies that z2 = Ep[z]. On the other hand, to ﬁnd an
expression for the distance between parties’ oﬀers add (24) and (26) and rearrange to obtain
















2 and pr = pr
1 + pr
2. Replacing f(z3)=f(z1) and z2 = p = Ep[z],e q .( 3 1 )
can be re-written as












Since ∆ ≡ p
f
1 −pr
1 ≥ 0 and f(z1) ≤ f(p), the distance between oﬀers cannot be smaller than in
the single-oﬀer case.
23Uniqueness can be easily proved using the results from the certainty case. If the regulator’s oﬀer is, say, the
pair A of Figure 1, the ﬁrm’s best response for a given value of z is unique and equal to the pair C of Figure 1 (if
for some value of z the pair A falls to the north-east of the z-line, the ﬁrm’s best response is A). And since the
ﬁrm’s best response is a non-decreasing function of z (strictly increasing if A is to the south-west of the z-line),
the ﬁrm’s best response to A is unique when z distributes according to F(z).
15Provided that in the absence of learning F(·) is a normal distribution with mean m0 and
precision h0, the parties’ (overall) equilibrium strategies satisfy
pf = m0 +
r
π
2h0 + γ (33)
and
pr = m0 −
r
π
2h0 − γ (34)




2, pr = pr
1 +pr
2,a n dγ is an arbitrary non-negative value that corresponds to
the last term of (32).
Unlike in the single-oﬀer game, these equilibrium oﬀers show that the introduction of un-
certainty regarding parties’ perception about the arbitrator’s preferences has signiﬁcant im-
plications in the multiple-oﬀers game. If parties are fully certain about the arbitrator’s ideal
settlement, the equilibrium of the game shows perfect convergence but if parties are just a bit
uncertain, divergence between parties’ oﬀers can be arbitrarily large.
This likely increase in oﬀers divergence raises the key question that to what extent the use
of multiple oﬀers prevents the arbitrator to improve her knowledge about the cost c.O n em a y
ﬁnd hard to believe that the arbitrator can learn the same about c regardless whether parties’
oﬀers are close to each other or very far apart. I turn to this issue in the following section.
4M u l t i p l e o ﬀers with learning
We now turn to the central model of the paper. Since we have already seen that is not sequen-
tially rational for the arbitrator to ignore parties’ oﬀers, the objective of this section is to show,
as in Gibbons’ single-oﬀer game, that there exists a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
this multiple-oﬀer ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game. Suppose that the arbitrator believes that p,t h e
average of the parties’ overall oﬀers, perfectly reveals cp,b o t ho na n do ﬀ the equilibrium path.




2} and pr = {pr
1,p r
2}, the arbitrator






2)/2).24 From (5), the arbitrator’s




p to the arbitrator. I see this as a reasonably possibility in the multiple-oﬀers case with random variables that
are not normally distributed because in such a case the parties’ equilibrium oﬀers are no longer center around
Ep[z] but they can be above or below Ep[z] (Montero, 2003).
16ideal settlement is then
z(ca,pf,pr)=
hm + haca + hpcp(p)
h + ha + hp (35)
As in the no-learning case, depending on the parties’ oﬀers there will be cut-oﬀ values
z1 <z 2 <z 3 such that if z(ca,pf,pr) falls in the region (−∞,z 1), the arbitrator will choose
{pr
1,p r




z(ca,pf,pr) falls in the region [z2,z 3) she will choose {pr
1,p
f
2},a n di fz(ca,pf,pr) falls in the




2},w h e r ez1, z2 and z3 are given by (21), (22) and (23),
respectively.
Using (35), we can then express the event that the arbitrator chooses {pr
1,p r
2} as ca <
C1(z1,z 2), that she chooses {p
f
1,p r








2} as C3(z2,z 3) <c a, where (recall that
z2 = p)
C1(z1,z 2)=
haz1 + h(z1 − m)+hp(z1 − cp(z2))
ha (36)
C2(z2)=
haz2 + h(z2 − m)+hp(z2 − cp(z2))
ha (37)
C3(z2,z 3)=
haz3 + h(z3 − m)+hp(z3 − cp(z2))
ha (38)
Given the probability that the parties assign to each of these four events occurring, a deriva-


























































































































where F(·) is now the distribution of ca conditional on cp, which is normal with mean Mp(cp)
given by (3) and precision
H0 =
(h + hp)ha
h + ha + hp (43)
As in the no-learning case, the ﬁrst-order conditions (39)–(42) do not lead to a unique
equilibrium because any of the four conditions is a linear combination of the other three. A
derivation analogous to that leading to (28) and (29) then yields the equilibrium conditions

























2 >∂ C 1/∂p
f
2, from the arguments leading to Proposition 2 we know that these
two conditions imply that C2(z2)=Mp(cp).
To compute C2(z2) (and also C1(z1,z 3) and C3(z2,z 3))w em a k eu s eo ft h ep r o p e r t i e st h a t
cp(z2), the rule the arbitrator uses to infer the value of cp from the parties’ oﬀers, must satisfy
in equilibrium. If the equilibrium value of p (= z2) is to reveal cp,i tm u s th o l dt h a tcp(z2)=cp
in equilibrium, so substituting cp(z2) for cp in Mp(cp) and using C2(z2)=Mp(cp) yields
cp(p = z2)=
(h + hp)p − hm
hp (46)
Replacing (46) into (36)–(38) yields C1(z1,z 2)=z1 − (z2 − z1)(h + hp)/ha, C2(z2)=z2 and
C3(z2,z 3)=z3 +( z3 − z2)(h + hp)/ha. The results imply both that parties’ oﬀers are center
around the mean of the parties’ belief about the arbitrator’s ideal settlement (p = Ep[z]=
Mp(cp)) and that, by arguments analogous to those leading to (32), the distance between the
parties’ oﬀe r si sg i v e nb y
















Provided that F(·) is a normal distribution with mean Mp(cp) and precision H0 given by




2H0 + Γ (48)
and
pr = Mp(cp) −
r
π
2H0 − Γ (49)




2, pr = pr
1 +pr
2,a n dΓ is an arbitrary non-negative value that corresponds to
the last term of (47). These results can be summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 3 The parties’ oﬀers strategies in (48) and (49) and the arbitrator’s decision
strategy based on her ideal settlement (35) and inference rule (46) constitute a separating perfect
Bayesian equilibria of the multiple-oﬀers ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game. As in Gibbons (1988), in
this equilibrium the arbitrator’s ideal settlement can be written as z = αp +( 1− α)ca,w h e r e
α =( h + hp)/(h + ha + hp).
In this separating equilibrium, the arbitrator infers cp from the average of the parties’ overall
oﬀers (not from the absolute value of the oﬀers submitted to each cost unit) according to (46),
then uses this value in (35) to compute her "Bayesian-updated" ideal settlement, and ﬁnally
chooses the combination of individual oﬀers that is closer to this ideal settlement.25 Anticipating
this, parties ﬁnd it optimal not to mislead the arbitrator and submit oﬀers satisfying (48) and
(49). As the precision of the parties’ signal about the true cost c increases relative to that of the
arbitrator’ signal, the arbitrator puts more weight on the information coming from the parties’
oﬀers than on her own signal in constructing her ideal settlement.
One of the main implications of Proposition 3 is that the multiplicity of oﬀers does not
aﬀect the arbitrator’s ability to learn from the parties’ oﬀers despite they may exhibit great
divergence. The reason for this is that the regulator does not learn from the absolute value of
individual oﬀers but rather from the way oﬀers are related. Since the multiplicity of oﬀers does
not remove the regularities that the parties’ oﬀers must exhibit in equilibrium, the arbitrator
uses these regularities (eqs. (44) and (45)) to correctly infer parties’ private information from
their oﬀers.
25Note that the arbitrator uses the same inference rule (46) regardless whether parties’ oﬀers are on or oﬀ the
equilibrium path.
195 Flexibility from multiple oﬀers
If the introduction of multiple oﬀers does not aﬀect learning, despite parties’ oﬀers can exhibit
substantial divergence, one could argue that the use of multiple oﬀers is socially desirable as
long as it provides the arbitrator with more ﬂexibility to put together a settlement closer to her
ideal settlement (i.e., the true cost of the eﬃcient ﬁrm) by combining oﬀers from both parties.
To explore such possibility, consider the following example in which parties’ expectation
about the arbitrator’s ideal settlement in the single-oﬀer arbitration game is 20 and that the
equilibrium oﬀers of such game are pr =1 0and pf =3 0 . Since the multiplicity of oﬀers does
not impaired arbitrator’s learning possibilities, parties’ expectation about the arbitrator’s ideal
settlement is also 20 in the two-oﬀers game. Consider now two equilibrium candidates of the
two-oﬀers game: (i) pr
1 =1 , pr
2 =2 , p
f
1 =1 8 ,a n dp
f
2 =1 9 ;a n d( i i )pr
1 =1 , pr





2 =3 4 . Both equilibrium candidates and the single-oﬀer equilibrium satisfy the condition
that the average of parties’ overall oﬀers is 20. But clearly, candidate (i) is, in expected terms,







2}. Candidate (ii), on the other hand, is the least attractive to the
arbitrator because she is expected to be oﬀ by 15 from her ideal choice.
The example seems to suggest that the welfare eﬀects from introducing multiple oﬀers
depend to a large extent on the way parties’ oﬀers are structured in equilibrium. As it turns
out, candidate (ii) is not a suitable equilibrium because it fails to satisfy equilibrium condition
(47). It is then possible to establish
Proposition 4 By combining oﬀers from both parties, the two-oﬀers game provides the arbi-
trator with ﬂexibility to construct a settlement that is expected to be closer to her ideal settlement
than the single-oﬀer game does.
Proof. Since overall oﬀers pr = pr
1 +pr




2 are as least as close to each other







2 or both (where prf >p fr) are expected to be closer to the arbitrator’s ideal
settlement than the oﬀers in the single-oﬀer game are. From Proposition 3, we know that
(pfr + prf)/2=p = Ep[z]. In addition, rearranging (47) yields












20which ﬁnishes the proof.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Motivated by the price-setting process in the water sector in Chile, I have developed a multiple-
oﬀers ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration model. The main result of the paper is that despite the increase in
divergence between parties’ oﬀers, the use of multiple oﬀer helps the arbitrator to establish a
ﬁnal price closer to her ideal settlement (i.e., the long-run cost of a hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm)
without aﬀecting her ability to learn from the parties’ oﬀers about the true cost of the eﬃcient
ﬁrm.
Since moving from a single-oﬀer scheme to a multiple-oﬀers scheme, whether with two or
more oﬀers, can increase the divergence between the parties’ overall oﬀers by an arbitrarily
large amount in equilibrium, one of the practical implications of the paper is that authority’s
proposal that call for a reduction in the number of cost units from something around 200 to 50
oﬀers (or down to two oﬀers for that matter) would make little diﬀerence, if any, in its eﬀort to
lower the divergence between parties’ oﬀers. I found, however, that failing to reduce divergence
is less of a concern because divergence does not aﬀect the arbitrator’s ability to learn from the
parties’ oﬀers.
Part of our results depend on the information assumption that parties have symmetric
information about the cost of the eﬃcient ﬁrm. It is likely, instead, that each of the parties will
be better informed about some aspects of the eﬃcient ﬁrm than the other party. As mentioned
by Gibbons (1988), it is possible that such information asymmetry may inﬂuence both the
means and the substance of the parties’ communication with the arbitrator. The eﬀect can be
even larger in multiple-oﬀer arbitration if the arbitrator has a good idea that such party is better
informed about that aspect of the eﬃcient ﬁrm than the other party. This is an interesting,
although diﬃcult, direction for further research.
Another question that deserves future work is why parties came to be in arbitration in the
ﬁrst place. The data summarized in Table 1 provide some insights. Ownership status seems
to explain, at least in part, why some parties are more likely to reach agreement than others.
In fact, for 3 of the 6 privately-owned companies,26 prices were determined through arbitration
while for only 2 of the 9 state-owned companies, prices were determined in such a way. Firm
26With the exception of Aguas Cordillera, these companies have gone private only recently: 1-2 years before
the price reviews.
21size, which may serve as a proxy for ﬁrm’s complexity and uncertainty about the arbitrator’
preferences, also seems relevant (although the largest two ﬁrms also happens to be in private
hands). Given the small sample size, however, there is no much else that can be said.
If we believe that negotiated settlements are valuable from a policy standpoint because it
allows parties more discretion in negotiating their own settlement (Farber, 1980), it is also
relevant to understand whether and how a reduction (or increase) in the number of oﬀers aﬀect
the likelihood of parties ending up in arbitration. Empirical and experimental work comparing
conventional and single-oﬀer ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration shows that it is not clear whether dispute
rates (i.e., number of negotiations that end in arbitration) and distance between parties’ oﬀers
are greater in conventional arbitration than in ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration (Farber and Bazerman,
1986 and 1989; and Ashenfelter et al., 1992).
Finally, there is the question about the overall optimality of the regulatory approach studied
in this paper relative to alternative approaches such as cost-of-return and price-cap schemes.
Perhaps more realistic within the existing regulatory scheme, it is to ask for ways in which
the construction of the hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm could be improved. Following the yardstick
regulatory scheme practiced in the water sector in the UK, one possibility it is to require,
at least partially, the use of actual costs from previous review periods and from other water
utilities.
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